

# The Proceedings *of* THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

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THE SOUTH CAROLINA  
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EUGENE P. LINK  
*Editor*

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*The South Carolina Historical Association held no regular meeting in the spring of 1944. The articles published here were submitted to the editor by members of the Executive committee.*

— E. P. L.





THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS IN THE WEST INDIES  
IN QUEEN ANNE'S WARRUTH BOURNE  
*Winthrop College*

On the eve of Queen Anne's War, in May 1702, Governor Codrington, in the Leeward Islands, had his will made and his house in order, he said, ready to drive the French from their settlements in St. Kitts. As good as his word, at the first official report of war, he forced de Gennes to surrender and permitted the people, with their few necessities, to depart for Hispaniola. Once at sea the French refugees rose against the English masters of the boats of truce and forced them to go, some to Martinique and some to Guadeloupe.

When Codrington heard of this treachery he sent to the governors of the French islands a furious demand that the villains responsible be sent back to St. Kitts within eight days or he would hang the French hostages. And he was not a man of two words, Codrington warned them.

Robert, the intendant at Martinique, sent to Secretary Ponchartrain a copy of the letter that it might be laid before her British Majesty. Such terrible threats had never been heard among the Barbary Turks over such a trifling matter, declared Robert, for the boats had been returned to the English without the slightest damage in the world. Martinique, Robert boasted, would hang ten Englishmen for every Frenchman executed.<sup>1</sup>

Robert was not so indignant, as he was determined to hold the additional population to reinforce the island. A previous letter of his confessed that Martinique was so lacking in bread, clothing, arms and cruisers that it was threatened with slave rebellions and enemy invasion. The island, already suffering from yellow fever and a hurricane and stripped by Chateau Renault's fleet, was dreading the arrival of another squadron from France which would utterly ruin the settlers. Robert begged for cruisers and grain ships.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Robert to Ponchartrain, September 1, 1702, State Papers, Foreign 78:153. This and the letter next referred to fell into English hands.

<sup>2</sup> Robert to Ponchartrain, August 5, 22, 25, 1702, State Papers, Foreign, 78:153, ff 106.

Two years later, de Machault was still pleading for two good sailers to protect Martinique and Guadeloupe from the insults of the English privateers. As for the outlying islands, he said, he had not a penny nor a gun for their defense and was trying to get the impoverished settlers to leave them. Not only the English but also the local officials were preventing these wretched people from sneaking off in Indian piroques, to the indignation of de Machault, for, he wrote, the king's subjects were not slaves.<sup>3</sup>

When it was learned in England that Robert had ordered the repatriates to come away from Hispaniola to Martinique, Secretary Nottingham directed Admiral Benbow, at Jamaica, to prevent it.<sup>4</sup> The Jamaicans complied because they did not wish to see the French massed at Hispaniola. Before the war began Benbow had warned the Board of Trade that Jamaica was not one-tenth inhabited "and those promiscuously over the island"; that the island could not raise an army of 2,000 white men and that the fortifications at Port Royal could not defend Kingston Harbor.<sup>5</sup>

Early in the war the Board of Trade represented to parliament the importance of the defense and preservation of Jamaica, for it lies "in the most valuable part of the West Indies." It is an easy distance from the Spanish Coast, with which the slave trade was permitted throughout the war, and also from the Havana, where the Spanish galleons and flota gathered for the European voyage. If Jamaica were not defended, observed the lords, the Spanish trade might be lost to the Dutch, who permitted free trade with the enemy.<sup>6</sup> However, the defenses of Jamaica were never adequate. In 1710, Governor Handasyde bewailed the recruits for his regiment as "the Saddest mortals ever sent out of the Kingdom." Even these were soon used to supply the lack of seamen on the men-of-war.<sup>7</sup> When such renowned French

<sup>3</sup> *Idem*; de Machault to Ponchartrain, October 6, 1704, State Papers, Foreign, 78:153. To the end of the war the French islands continued to starve. Cf. Lieutenant Governor Douglas to the Board of Trade, November 28, 1711. *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies*, 1711-12, No. 194.

<sup>4</sup> Minutes of the Jamaica council, February 5, 1702/3, C.O. 140:6. Nottingham to Beckford, January 23, 1702/3, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic*, 1702-03.

<sup>5</sup> Benbow to the Board of Trade, January 2, 1700/1, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1701-02, No. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Leo F. Stock, *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America* (Washington, 1920) III, 59, March 23, 1703/4. The Act of 6 Anne, cap. 64 for encouraging trade to America permitted no molestation of the Spanish Coast between the Chagres and the Rio de la Hacha, but the privateers ignored the act.

<sup>7</sup> Handasyde to the Board of Trade, June 4, 1710, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1710-11, No. 253.



warriors were at Hispaniola as du Casse or d'Iberville, Jamaica was apprehensive of invasion.

In the later years of the war the Jamaica merchants urged the removal of the French from Hispaniola, "a sad and grievous thorn in the side of Jamaica." In King William's War Codrington, senior, had refused to let the French who had been driven from St. Kitts go to Martinique or Guadeloupe and insisted on their being sent to Hispaniola, against the wishes of Jamaica.\*

The more industrious French took from the Spanish two-thirds of the island. Thereafter, the French rivalled Jamaica in sugar production, interfered in the Spanish trade, and could invade Jamaica "on a sudden" without warning.<sup>9</sup>

At the end of the war, Governor Lord Archibald Hamilton lamented "how scattered a body we are for the defense of so large and plentiful an Island." When he reviewed the troops he had to send a body of horse into the regions from which the militia was drawn because of the planters' apprehension of the slaves.<sup>10</sup> Treaties were made to confine the maroons, runaway Negroes, to their mountain towns. Pirates who harried the Spanish Coast were offered full pardon if they would come in to protect Jamaica. Only the cessation of war relieved Jamaica of her fear of Hispaniola.

The Jamaicans, therefore, always were pleased to obey the Admiralty order to send to England all prisoners of war. They were cared for, though numerous, without financial strain at fifteen pence a day until they could be dispatched on the usually frequent cruisers or fleets that were going to England. As the Jamaicans took "ten times" as many prisoners as the French and Spanish did they could not have exchanged them all locally and did not wish to turn them loose.<sup>11</sup>

In 1705, Governor Handasyde learned by a spy that the lieutenant governor of Hispaniola, "de Chouppe Salamper," who was "a very cunning, intriguing blade," was coming in a flag of truce with some English "turtlers" from Andora Bay. Han-

\* Nellis M. Crouse, *The French Struggle for the West Indies* (Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 165-6. The mistake of allowing the French to return to St. Kitts was not repeated at the end of Queen Anne's War.

<sup>9</sup> Richard Harris to Popple, May 25, 1709, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, 1708-09, No. 540.

<sup>10</sup> Hamilton to the Board of Trade, October 10, 1712, *Ibid.*, 1712-14, No. 94.

<sup>11</sup> Minutes of the Jamaica council, December 7, 1702, C.O. 140:6. After their prison was burnt in the Kingston fire the prisoners were supported by the church wardens.

dasyde ordered the captain at Port Royal to keep the flag of truce outside the harbor while exchanging prisoners and to have it escorted back to Hispaniola.<sup>12</sup> This fear of spying enemies was not the chief reason for objecting to a local exchange with the French but it was an important one. To prevent spying, the Spanish prisoners, who were exchanged locally, were carried to the Spanish Coast in the boats which went there daily.<sup>13</sup> This fear was universal in America.

In 1707 Governor Nathan Johnson of the Carolinas issued a proclamation ordering John Kimble, master of the *William Galley*, to transport 118 French and Spanish prisoners of war to Virginia and to deliver them there to Governor Nott. If Virginia refused to accept them within a week, Kimble was directed to give the prisoners the ship (for £400), its instruments for navigation, a calendar and one month's provision of food and water, so that the prisoners might go "to Martinique, the Havana or whatever place they shall think fitting."

The Virginia council complained to the Board of Trade that Carolina's way of disposing of prisoners would be "of ill consequence to Her Majesty's service and dangerous to this country," for it was not "to be imagined," said the council, "that so many Men bred up at Sea and most of them privateers" would depart from the coast so ill-provided with necessaries. Rather they would hover about to intercept the trade and even land and rob the settlers. The council also pointed out the danger of the prisoners returning to the French islands with a knowledge of "the naked and defenseless condition of the country."<sup>14</sup>

The next year the Virginians were alarmed by a report from St. Thomas that the French of Martinique were coming to Virginia with expectations of great booty, saying "how easy it might be had." Governor Jenings thought it very reasonable because the increased cruiser strength in the Channel and at Jamaica would force the French privateers "to adventure into places where they expect less opposition though they cannot hope for so considerable profite."<sup>15</sup> Shortly after this, Lord Cornbury advised the Board of Trade that vessels in New York Harbor dared not "peep out now."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>13</sup> Handasyde to the Lord High Treasurer, December 14, 1708, *Calendar of Treasury Papers*, 1708-1714, CX, 79.

<sup>14</sup> Minutes of the Board of Trade in the Huntington Library, the Board of Trade to Sunderland, February 10, 17, 1706/7.

<sup>15</sup> Jenings to the Board of Trade, March 21, 1707/8, *Calendar of State Papers*, Col., 1708-09, No. 4.

<sup>16</sup> Cornbury to the Board of Trade, July 1, 1708, *ibid.*, No. 10.



The English colonists were kept "vastly uneasie" by the French privateers ranging all the way from the Newfoundland fisheries and "that little Dunkirk," Port Royal, Acadia, down to Martinique. They came from such French bases as St. Malo, which was estimated to have constantly at sea ten thousand privateers, half of them on the American coasts.<sup>17</sup> The Board of Trade feared that if the northern traders should forbear carrying provisions to the southern plantations it would "tend to the Ruin of these Islands."<sup>18</sup>

The northern traders were reluctant to come into the Caribbean because, if captured, they were in danger of being carried into France, there to starve or to be impressed in the French vessels and subsequently, if caught, be hanged as traitors by the English.<sup>19</sup> At best, they were exchanged from Dinant to Plymouth and then allowed to run, barefooted and ragged, in droves. If they found no employment they starved, were impressed or were hanged as thieves. The commissioners for the Sick and Wounded were supposed to care for them for thirty days, from funds acquired by the Admiralty's droits, or the queen's bounty,<sup>20</sup> but, as the navy treasury was always in embarrassment, the commissioners complained constantly of the difficulty of maintaining prisoners.<sup>21</sup>

The following impassioned description of the returned seamen of King William's War was in no way overdrawn in Queen Anne's:

If our press is so great this winter that they meet the poor captive wretches when they Return home in their Lousie Cloathes from France and beg their way near an 150 miles then before they come to London catch them and carry them on Board, Rags and Lice as they Run, put them down in the Hold of the Vessel to lie on the Boards or what they pleas, if they be without bedding and as Queen Esther said if they perish they perish.<sup>22</sup>

Since the northern traders had no mind to starve, hang or be impressed in the navy, they stayed away from the eastern Caribbean where the privateers were thickest.

<sup>17</sup> Colonel Vetch to Sunderland (?), August 2, 1709, *ibid.*, No. 666.

<sup>18</sup> Minutes of the Board of Trade, Huntington Library, 1703, f. 125. Also Captain Gruchy's letter, March 6, 1703, Adm. 1:3930.

<sup>19</sup> Petition of the wives of captured seamen to the Admiralty, January (?), 1711/12, complaining of the great cruelty of the French in impressing the prisoners in their service and asking for their exchange. Adm. 1:2050.

<sup>20</sup> Admiralty Minutes, April 10, June 15, 22, 1703, Adm. 3:18; Adm. 1:3618, March 27, 1712.

<sup>21</sup> Letters Relating to the Admiralty and Vice Admiralty Business, October 25, 1711, Adm. 2:1051. Estimates of the Debt of the Navy are to be found in Official Papers Relating to the Navy, 1688-1715.

<sup>22</sup> William Hodges, *Relief of Seamen* (1695).

At the very beginning of the war the Barbados government complained that though it spent £4,000 [an exaggeration] in three months all this was not sufficient to clear the seas of the vast number of privateers, estimated by some at three thousand.<sup>23</sup> Two years later the merchants lamented "what few ships they must expect the next year to come from the northward because so many have been taken this warr." The loss of "nigh half" their ships, they thought, would be reflected in high prices and a scarcity of provisions, since all meat and flour was imported.<sup>24</sup> Governor Crowe, in 1708, warned that due to the lack of cruiser protection, two French sloops might take all their northern trade and starve them.<sup>25</sup>

After 1709, the menace was increased when Louis XIV dispersed the grand fleet and turned all the royal ships over to the privateers to make what profit and destruction they could. The Barbados assembly was warned to repair the forts since "Her Majesty's great and glorious arms in Europe" were driving the enemy "to seek some more probable success abroad."<sup>26</sup>

The Leeward Islands constantly bewailed "the weak and hazardous circumstances" of their settlements, which were the most exposed and the nearest to Guadeloupe and Martinique. Antigua, "the most windward, best and richest," was also the most accessible by means of the numerous creeks and inlets.<sup>27</sup> The poorer sort of settlers were being driven off the islands by fear, poverty and the rapaciousness of the rich, and usually absentee, landlords.<sup>28</sup> This desertion left a sparse population of a few thousand on each island, the planters outnumbered three to one by their slaves, who were the bait which attracted the French marauders.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Petition of the President and Council of Barbados, November 10, 1702, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, 1702-03, No. 136. Governor Granville reported that there were ninety English prizes at Martinique. Cf. Minutes of the Board of Trade, in the Huntington Library, 1700-03, f. 103.

<sup>24</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, September 6, 1704. C.O. 31:8.

<sup>25</sup> Crowe to the Board of Trade, August 18, 1708, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1708-09, No. 96.

<sup>26</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, March 22, 1708/9, C.O. 31:10.

<sup>27</sup> Captain Gale, whose ship was taken into Martinique by the *Tempest*, on his escape, offered to take back a squadron and destroy the French at St. Pierre, where, he said, there were twenty-eight privateers, which "continually privateer it about our Islands, being always well manned with hardened, bold fellows by which means they pick up abundance of our rich prizes and mightily annoy our whole trade." Gale, December 6, 1710. Adm. 1:1824.

<sup>28</sup> Parke to the Board of Trade, October 31, 1706, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1706-08, No. 559; Parke to the Lord High Treasurer, November 18, 1707, *Calendar of Treasury Papers*, 1702-07, CIII, 68.

<sup>29</sup> St. Leger to the Board of Trade, August 5, 1712, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1712-14, No. 55x.



After driving the French from St. Kitts, Codrington, in 1703, was encouraged to assault Guadeloupe and laid it waste. The ruined French took to the sea and soon forced the Leeward Islands to appeal to the queen for cruisers to protect them from the twenty-two French privateers and the squadron for which Robert had sent home. The loss of almost all of their provision ships not only "wounded the inhabitants in their fortunes" but discouraged the traders, said the agent, Colonel Thomas, and he feared that the islands would be left destitute.<sup>30</sup> The Board of Trade urged that three "good and nimble salers" be sent to the region to secure the trade and get intelligence of the enemy.<sup>31</sup> Although it had for years been conceded that a French invasion of the Leewards could cause a loss of sugar and slaves which twenty years could not repair,<sup>32</sup> the navy never spared the Leeward Islands three cruisers, and sometimes not any at all. Therefore the provision ships which came down were often captured and provisioned the French instead of the English.

The French did not fail to exploit their rich opportunity for booty. In the spring of 1706 Paris was extolling d'Iberville and du Chavagnac, who, in February, swept over St. Kitts and took several ships, five hundred prisoners, and six thousand slaves to be sold to the Spaniards "at a great price." The loss to St. Kitts was reckoned at three million pounds.<sup>33</sup> In April they went to Nevis and, with a loss of only fifty men, did half a million pounds damage, took thirty ships and seven thousand Negroes and laid the country waste, so that it would not recover in ten years, boasted the French.<sup>34</sup> Left to subsist on a meagre royal bounty, the islands justified the prophecy.<sup>35</sup>

When d'Iberville saw the English coming to Nevis, he realized that he could not take off all the booty and hundreds of prisoners, so he took with him some prominent hostages and a promissory note for 14,000 Negroes, or, in lieu of them, one hundred pieces of eight for each one not delivered later. In 1714, Nevis was still trying to secure the release of the hostages. The islanders had defaulted on their note because d'Iberville,

<sup>30</sup> Petition of Colonel William Thomas to the Board of Trade, November 17, 1703, Adm. 1:3814.

<sup>31</sup> Minutes of the Board of Trade, in the Huntington Library, 1703, f. 103.

<sup>32</sup> Charles S. S. Higham, *Development of the Leeward Islands Under the Restoration, 1660-1688* (Cambridge, England, 1921), p. 189.

<sup>33</sup> *Paris Gazette*, May 17, 1706, Adm. 1:3931.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, May 22, 1706.

<sup>35</sup> The Queen to Parke, September 4, 1708, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1708-09, No. 127.

contrary to his pledge, had run off their stock, burned their homes and threatened to sell some of the settlers to the Spaniards as slaves.<sup>36</sup>

The ruined islands were left deserted after 1706 and Governor Parke, at Antigua, awaited an expected attack by du Casse and thirty privateers, who had flat-bottomed boats for invasion, manned by hundreds of desperadoes. Parke complained that the walls of the fort had been thrown down by an earthquake and that the planters would not spare their Negroes to rebuild them. The regiment had been sent to St. Kitts to subsist cheaply on Indian provisions, since their officers had pocketed their pay and were now, most of them, taking their ease in London.<sup>37</sup>

Fortunately for the Leeward Islands, du Casse had come only to convoy to Europe the Spanish plate fleet and not to attack the English. The inhabitants, however, in fear, began to migrate, many to Jamaica where they got waste land, rent free.<sup>38</sup>

The privateers remained "thick as bees" about the Leeward Islands and few trade ships arrived.<sup>39</sup> How starved the islanders were is vividly pictured by the Barbados council minutes which record permission given to transport to the Leeward Islands 400 barrels of Irish beef "lying on hands" in "a perishing condition," and some firkins of rancid butter which could not be sold in Barbados.<sup>40</sup>

The Leeward Islands considered it plain that they were justified in ignoring the admiralty order to send prisoners home and they regularly and promptly exchanged the few French prisoners they took. As the other islands would not help them, with money or troops, to maintain their prisoners,<sup>41</sup> they could not confine them and it was dangerous to permit them to wander at will, spying out the most strategic points of attack and co-operating with the daring enemy privateers.

In fact, great numbers of the Irish settlers on St. Kitts and Montserrat and the Scotch at Barbados fraternized with the

<sup>36</sup> Petition of Nevis, August 6, 1714, *ibid.*, 1714-15, No. 10.

<sup>37</sup> Parke to the Lord High Treasurer, November 18, 1707, *Calendar of Treasury Papers*, 1702-07, CIII, 68; *Calendar of State Papers*, Col., 1708-09, No. 5.

<sup>38</sup> Handasyde to the Board of Trade, June 14, 1709, *Calendar of State Papers*, Col., 1708-09, No. 573.

<sup>39</sup> Jon Dickinson to John Askew, March (?), 1710, *ibid.*, 1710-11, No. 177.

<sup>40</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, November 21, 1707, C.O. 31:10.

<sup>41</sup> Lt. Governor Douglas to the Board of Trade, August 1, 1711, *Calendar of State Papers*, Col., 1711-12, No. 63.



French, and local capture and imprisonment became a sort of visit with friends. In 1710 Joseph Grannis petitioned the council of Barbados to exchange for any Barbados gentleman at Martinique the kinsman of M. Bantherau's now captive at Martinique, because when the three daughters of Grannis were taken prisoner to Martinique they were kindly entertained by Bantherau and sent to Antigua instead of France.<sup>42</sup>

Throughout the war the maintenance and exchange of prisoners was a major problem at Barbados. Cruisers seldom left for England oftener than once a year, if that frequently, and, especially after an act of 1706 forbade the impressment of seamen in the colonies, the men-of-war were often too thinly manned to carry prisoners safely.<sup>43</sup> In fact, the captains, being short-handed, occasionally pressed the French prisoners into service,<sup>44</sup> although it was against the law.<sup>45</sup> The cost of maintaining the prisoners for months until they could be sent to England was too great a strain on the finances.

On the other hand, however, the Barbadians feared to send back French prisoners to Martinique after they had strayed over the island, viewing the layout, noting the number of trading vessels, the position and weakness of the fortifications and the general condition of the island.<sup>46</sup> And well they might, for at the beginning of the war Barbados had no effective force. Guns lay unmounted with the carriages rotting; scrap iron and rocks were stored as ammunition; the militia was laughable, and mutineers soon ran away with the local dispatch boat. The Barbadians, greatly outnumbered by their slaves, began the war alarmed by a rumored plot of the Negroes to burn the Bridgetown, knock

<sup>42</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, July 27, 1710, C.O. 31:10. Father Labat, the adventurous French priest who was at Martinique in the early years of the war, commented that the French women always expressed fear of the English privateers but that they were not so honest in their conduct with their own men. Cf. Jean Bapiste Labat, *Nouveau Voyage aux Iles de l'Amerique* (Paris, 1722).

<sup>43</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, November 28, 1710, C.O. 31:9. In 1704, Captain George Martin captured seventy prisoners from the *Prince Veranea*, who "did rise upon us in the night but was soon quailed by the loss of three men." Cf. Martin, October 1, 1704, Adm. 1:2092.

<sup>44</sup> In 1707 Dilkes was ordered, in the Mediterranean, that French prisoners be "taken on" for the journey. Cf. Admiralty Orders, December 22, 1707; January 15, 1707/8, Adm. 2:37, ff. 49, 123.

<sup>45</sup> Stock, *Debates*, III, 152, December 17, 1707; Admiralty Orders, III, 156, April 19, 1703.

<sup>46</sup> Labat wrote in his *Nouveau Voyage* that on a trip to Barbados he noted the defenses of Carlisle Bay. A good engineer, he advised the French, before the war began, that the island could be taken by five thousand Creole troops. The plate of the island, he remarked, was worth more than several galleons. He also commented upon the curiosity of the "canailles" over his priestly vestments.

the whites in the head and take the government and the women. Captain Kirby lent the government some powder, to be returned after the emergency because the *Ruby's* stores were depleted by the stay in the tropics.<sup>47</sup>

By 1705 the Barbadians, in appealing against the sugar duty, were claiming that two-thirds of the Christians had gone off the island and one-third of the land lay waste, and that the French, in eighteen months, had seized shipping valued at £500,000. Yet this poorly defended island was reckoned to bring in annually £300,000 to the proprietors and £70,000 in the customs duty to England.<sup>48</sup>

The islanders soon found that taking prisoners to feed and guard burdened the treasury. In 1704 their president warned the council,

... the french prisoners are unprovided for and must inevitably starve without a speedy supply [of money] which barbarous usage will become a fatal president [to the French] in their resentment to all English prisoners that fall into their hands.

Instead of providing for the prisoners the assembly soon cut their allowance of food in half and they were left starving, indeed.<sup>49</sup>

A general cartel arranged at Martinique, March, 1707, relieved Barbados temporarily of the burden of the prisoners. Its terms are worth repeating:<sup>50</sup>

- I. All the French prisoners were to be returned and all future captives were to be returned in ten days, or, if less than twenty-five in number, within twenty days. They were to be taken nowhere but to Martinique, without distinction as to whether they were from France or the islands.
- II. The English prisoners were to be restored, with like treatment, and sent to Barbados from all the French islands.
- III. Barbados was to try to restore the French taken prisoner to New England.
- IV. The Spanish were to be treated as French, and the Dutch as English.

<sup>47</sup> Richard Kirby, January (?), 1701/2, Adm. 1:2004.

<sup>48</sup> Pollexfen to the Board of Trade, September 4, 1700, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1700, No. 751. On August 16, 1712, Lowther reported that there were only 3,438 whites fit to bear arms and 41,970 slaves in Barbados. Cf. *ibid.*, 1712-14, No. 45v. See, also, Stock, *Debates*, III, 93-4, a petition from Barbados, February 14, 1705/6.

<sup>49</sup> The prisoners were supported by money from a three-bit tax per head on slaves and Negroes. Cf. Minutes of the Barbados assembly, March 16, 1703/4, C.O. 31:7. For a description of conditions in Barbados and other islands see Ruth Bourne, *Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies* (Yale Press, 1939) Ch. II.

<sup>50</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, March 14, 1706/7, C.O. 31:8.



- V.-VI. Free Negroes and mulattoes of each nation were to be restored and not to be detained under any pretence [of slavery?]. If they were in Bermuda or New England, or wherever they were, the governments were to try to return them.
- VII. Prisoners were to be treated with humanity and given the provisions of a common seaman—one pound of beef, pork, salt fish or peas, and one pound of biscuit, flour or cassava bread per day. Officers [and gentlemen] were to be treated with distinction according to their rank.
- VIII. Flags of truce were not to be stopped more than ten days and to be proved by those that sent them.
- IX. Ships of Jamaica caught to windward while bound to Barbados were to be treated as of Barbados and French sent from New England to Barbados were to be exchanged as of Barbados.

In the same year of 1707 a land bank was set up in Barbados which issued many notes before it was disallowed at home. Thereafter the treasury was empty and the island's credit gone. The council and assembly deadlocked and all business was at a stand. "For want of money," the president again warned them, "the French prisoners are in danger of being famished, a breach of Laws observed by all Nations and a scandal to the Brittish Nation," which would "be retaliated by the like cruel usage of our fellow subjects in French prisons."<sup>51</sup>

The gunner at the chief fort at Needham's garrison reported that the matrosses (gunner's mates), having been forced for six months "to feed upon crabbs, pursley and caterpillers [cabbage palm worms?]" and tired of guarding the French prisoners, had deserted the fort, or would do suddenly. He begged for a speedy relief of their sufferings.<sup>52</sup> Although the assembly could sometimes find a few hundred pounds to restock his Excellency's cellar, it could find only five pounds at a time for "emergent service" to feed the soldiers and prisoners.<sup>53</sup> When the assembly had no money for the purpose, Captain Bourn, an indefatigable cruiser, advanced out of his pocket the whole sum necessary to send his prisoners in his own boat to Martinique.<sup>54</sup> In spite of these occasional changes, Barbados was always unable or unwilling to provide decently for the prisoners of war.

When Robert Lowther arrived as governor at Barbados he began to oppose the local exchange of prisoners and set forth his

<sup>51</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, May 15, 1708, C.O. 31:9.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, November 27, 1708.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, January 24, February 23, 1709/10, May 19, July 27, 1710. In 1707, Sam Cox advanced twenty shillings a day out of his pocket for the prisoners brought in by the *Lowestoft*, "else they would have starved." Cf. C.O. 31:8, February 10, 1706/7.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, C.O. 31:9, October 3, November 21, 28, December 11, 1710.

objections at length in a letter to the Board of Trade, in explanation of his refusal to exchange a number of gentlemen taken by Captain Thomas, in 1711:<sup>55</sup>

"I may admit," he wrote, "that the French take more prisoners than we doe, and that the sending them to France is some obstruction to trade, and a high aggravation of the misfortune of such as fall into the hands of the French; yet notwithstanding his I am humbly of opinion, that it is not only against the Queen's interest but also against the advantage and policy of his Island to settle a cartell with the French: to make this obvious to your Lordships, I take the liberty to put you in mind that the people of Martinique are the very dregs and refuse of the French Nation, and that they intirely subsist by piracy and privateering, and that they lose nothing when they fall into our hands but some armes and ammunition. I would likewise remarke that this loss to them is so very inconsiderable when a cartell is settled with them, that those very people which have been taken one week, and sent to Martinique the next, have in the week after they arrived there returned upon our coastes, for they have nothing wherewith to subsist themselves and families but what they take from us, and that therefore it must of necessity happen thus unless they are sent to Europe; but must be constrained to go into the King's service; so by this means not only families at Martinique will be utterly undone, and the country distressed by the great increase of poore rates, but it will also disable them from fitting out their number of privateers, which will redound as much to our advantage as to their ruin, being they have little or nothing to subsist on but the provisions they take from the Queen's subjects. I beg leave to say a word or two to obviate one objection more that I fancy may be made against sending the prisoners of war to Europe: the objection is this, that all the ill consequences that attend the French prisoners being sent to Europe will also befall such of the Queen's subjects that are taken in a trading vessel, [they] have either money, credit or friends to support them under such a misfortune, and to replace them in the same way of livelihood, if not the same condition, which is not the Frenches case, that live in Martinique. I have only one more objection to offer to your Lordships against settling a cartell with the French at Martinique which is, that it will give a great opportunity to carry on a trade between this place and them."

The Board of Trade responded that it approved the reasons given and thought that Governor Lowther was "very much in the right" to refuse the cartel.<sup>56</sup> The Barbados council always denied that the flags of truce were used for illegal trading, but the poor planters in the assembly frequently opposed the cartels because they were jealous of the trade of the rich.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Lowther to the Board of Trade, August 20, 1711, *Calendar of State Papers*, Col. 1711-12, No. 77.

<sup>56</sup> The Board of Trade to Lowther, November 22, 1711, *ibid.*, No. 186.

<sup>57</sup> When Sisson returned from making the cartel of 1707, the assembly of Barbados addressed Governor Crowe to inquire if the cartel had been settled to Her Majesty's advantage, or, contrary to the assembly's request, hastily and in the interests of certain individuals. Cf. Minutes of the Barbados council, May 27, 1707, C.O. 31:10.



In 1702 the customs commissioners complained to the council that the first flag of truce from Martinique brought a considerable quantity of claret, which, notwithstanding all possible care by the commissioners, was "privately put ashore." The council found the complaint groundless. Admiral Sir Hoveden Walker, whose fleet was there at the time, reported, however, that the flag of truce, "as they call it," was really there for collusive trade and to gain military intelligence. One of the Frenchmen seized was condemned to death, and others were impressed on the men-of-war.<sup>58</sup>

In 1708 Governor Parke complained from the Leeward Islands to the Board of Trade:<sup>59</sup>

I wish your Lordships could find some way to prevent the trade between Ireland and the French Islands for I never send a flag of truce but they find Irish ships there with beef, etc. Whilst the last flag of truce was at Martinique there came in three large ships directly from Ireland with beef and their Irish colours flying, 'tis a very great shame.

At the very time that Parke wrote this, his enemies were dispatching home against him a long list of grievances, one of the chief ones being that he engaged extensively in illegal trade through his flags of truce, which were manned by brutal ex-pirates. Parke declared that he never had, coming or going, more than a hogshead of claret for his own table, and that it was his zeal in preventing illegal trade which caused the hostility of such men as Chester, who said that he would be content to live seven years in Hell to be revenged on Parke.<sup>60</sup> The condemnation in English courts, however, of the French flag of truce *Society* convinced the home government that flags of truce were used in the Leeward Islands, at least, with intent to color illegal trade.<sup>61</sup>

A circular of 1710 from the Board of Trade informed the governors of the evidences of illegal trade with Martinique. "We think it therefor necessary," the letter instructed them, "that you take all possible care when any flags of truce shall arrive—[that] they be not permitted to trade during their stay there or allowed to go on shore to examine the strength and condition of your

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, September 29, October 13, 1702, C.O. 31:6; letter of Walker,

<sup>59</sup> Parke to the Board of Trade, July 1, 1708, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1708-09, No. 5. A commendatory reply was sent by the Board, October 26, 1708. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 166.

<sup>60</sup> Parke to the Board of Trade, August 24, 1708, *ibid.*, 1708-09, No. 106; also, *ibid.*, Nos. 625, 626.

<sup>61</sup> Order of the Queen, December 15, 1709, *ibid.*, No. 909.

government and you are to give us an account from time to time [of the flags of truce]."<sup>62</sup>

Handasyde had already assured the Board of Trade that he always sent home Spanish flags of truce as in his opinion they came only as spies, and that he used the opportunity of the boats that went there daily to trade to send prisoners to the Spanish Coast. Although, he said, he sometimes permitted the Spanish to come to buy legal goods, he did not entertain the French at all.<sup>63</sup>

The free-trading Dutch island of Curacao and the neutral Danish island of St. Thomas were other troublesome centers of illegal trade. Flags of truce used these islands as exchange depots in which to dump prisoners, who then hired themselves out to the privateers and smugglers at high wages.<sup>64</sup> English and French vessels were "blown" to these islands by acts of providence. To pay for repairs the masters exchanged their rum and sugar, cotton, ginger and indigo, and also took on linen, silks, hardware and ammunition and arms from Europe, small beer and flour from New York and Pennsylvania, pitch, tar and timber from the Carolinas and New England.<sup>65</sup>

Though he discouraged it, he declared, Parke defended the trade to St. Thomas as useful in securing vital information. When he sent a flag of truce, often at his own expense, he always persuaded "gentlemen of the best fashion" to go in them, he asserted, "for the honour of the Nation." What care he had taken to preserve the cartels (chiefly to Martinique) when the assembly had raised no tax "to pay them or anything else," he said, was "very eminent to the whole Island" and a thing "of the highest consequence to it." We went on to explain:<sup>66</sup>

There being nigh 50 privateers in Martinico, and scarce seven belong[ing] to this Government, the French have so great a superiority of prisoners that if they either exchanged man for man or sent them to France, these Islands would neither have any sailors to man their vessells or people to make any tolerable defense should the Islands be attacked as every year it is in danger. Nor without it would the Northern vessells bring them any of those commoditys

<sup>62</sup> Circular of the Board of Trade to the governors, January (?), 1709/10, *ibid.*, 1710-11, No. 909.

<sup>63</sup> Handasyde to the Board of Trade, June 14, 1709, June 4, 1710, *ibid.*, 1708-09, No. 573; *ibid.*, 1710-11, No. 253.

<sup>64</sup> Popple to Burchet, January 16, 1710/11, *ibid.*, 1711-12, No. 30; also, January 19, 1710/11, *ibid.*, Nos. 47, 47i.

<sup>65</sup> Popple to Penn, February 20, 1709/10, *ibid.*, 1710-11, No. 138; the Proprietors of Carolina to the Board of Trade, February 1, 1709/10, *ibid.*, No. 97; Richard Oglethorpe to Sunderland, May 19, 1710, *ibid.*, No. 245.

<sup>66</sup> Parke to the Board of Trade, September 9, 1710, *ibid.*, No. 391.



they so absolutely want, the sugar being too bad for their consumption [purchase], and the rumm 200 p.c. dearer then at Barbados. But the benefit of the cartel encourages them against all these disadvantages, if a saylor is taken he is immediately returned and follows his business, while they who trade to the other Governments by lying long in gaol, and by being sent at last prisoners to Europe are put quite out of employ and ruined. Another very eminent advantage they have is that they gain intelligence of the designs of the French who are allways insulting them without any fear of the French making the like [use of our flags of truce].

In spite of his explanations there is much evidence that the charges against Parke were true. He did carry on an extensive trade by flags of truce. It is also obvious that he interfered with the illegal trade of most of the powerful planters. In December, 1710, when the French privateers were closing in on the Leeward Islands, the conspirators against him persuaded the unreasoning mob that Parke intended to turn the island over to the enemy. Actuated by a desire for revenge, as well as by fear, the Antiguans rose against Parke and murdered and mutilated him. The French were checked by an accidental encounter with a man-of-war from Barbados, but they landed on Montserrat and carried off a few prisoners and 1,500 slaves.<sup>67</sup>

The next year, 1712, the Leeward Islanders trembled before the awaited assault of the combined forces of the notorious corsairs, Cassard and du Guay. The Antiguans sent to Barbados for the warships and some troops. At the time the captains of the cruisers, under captains Hamilton and Constable, were disputing with Governor Lowther about prize condemnations and the transportation of some prisoners of war and the ringleaders in the assassination of Parke. The captains maintained that it was against their orders to leave; Lowther accused them of encouraging rebellion.<sup>68</sup>

The captains finally arrived in the Leeward Islands after the French had sailed away, so they returned to Barbados, leaving the islands "in very mean circumstances." They were no sooner back in Barbados to start a fresh quarrel with Lowther about the convoying of trade when the Antiguans sent for them again in very great haste for the French were landing there. The cruisers

<sup>67</sup> Hamilton to the Board of Trade, April 5, 1711, and to Dartmouth, June 2, 1711, *ibid.*, 1710-11, Nos. 728, 868.

<sup>68</sup> Lowther refused to take some prisoners Captain Constable had brought in, so Constable sent them to Martinique himself. He got a receipt for the surplus and a promise of the governor there to send English prisoners when he got some to make up the deficit. Cf. Constable, February 8, March 16, 1711/12, Adm. 1:1595. Lowther to the Board of Trade, March 28, 1712, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1711-12, No. 434.

did not go, however, until August 23. By that time the French had gone, not to come back. The captains rejected the suggestion that they attack Guadeloupe, since stronger forces had failed to take it in 1703. Another plan to have the French prisoners taken through the squadron in a flag of truce and then carried to Martinique to report their strength was also scorned. After five days of quarreling with the Antiguans, the captains received word that hostilities had ceased between the French and English, so they sailed away again.<sup>69</sup> The islanders wrote home that the captains "never intended to do them any service" and consequently their staying in Barbados would have "caused greater apprehension in the enemy" than their coming down to the Leeward Islands.<sup>70</sup>

The Leeward Islanders, when they received news of the truce, "with hearts full of joy" sent congratulations to Her Majesty for

putting an end to the late bloody warr, by a most advantageous and glorious Peace, etc., to the unspeakable satisfaction of us your poor distressed inhabitants of this Collony, whose utter ruin under God, it has most effectually prevented, when wee were on all sides environed by an enemy whose subtilty being equal to their power oblidged us at vast expense allways to be in armes.<sup>71</sup>

On October 14, 1712, the Barbadians received the Proclamation of the Cessation of Arms, which was not to begin "beyond the Line" until six months after it began in Europe. They immediately began to arrange a cartel with Governor Philypeaux of Martinique for the exchange of prisoners and to observe a truce in the islands. The French thought that the truce began in October and ended in February while Lowther thought that it began in January and ended in June. Some thought that "beyond the Line" referred to the Tropic of Cancer and some thought to the equator, while it would seem to have applied to some meridian. Therefore, an agreement for a *modus vivendi* was imperative.

While the negotiations were going on, the captains heard that the French had taken six English vessels into Martinique and when Lowther would not rescue them at once, Hamilton sent

<sup>69</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, July 14, 1712, C.O. 31:9. Hamilton's letter of January 26, 1712/3 contained The Representation of Captains to the Admiralty, September 20, 30, 1712, Adm. 1:1878.

<sup>70</sup> Petition from Antigua to the Admiralty, October 10, 1712, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1712-14, No. 95. For this narrative see Bourne, *Queen Anne's Navy in the West Indies*, pp. 240-253.

<sup>71</sup> Address of Antigua to the Queen, [1712?] *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1712-14, No. 231.



Captain Gunman to bring them away and to secure Philypeaux's pledge that all English ships and prisoners should be released when brought in. When Lowther sent his commissioners to Martinique in the H.M.S. *Swallow*, he tried to prevent any naval officer from being concerned in the cartel.

When the commissioners arrived at Martinique in December, 1712, Philypeaux refused to receive the prisoners, saying the truce was to last until the first of February, or even the day after and that the prisoners could be exchanged then. He also rejected the proposed extension of the truce, explaining that unless the warships and also Jamaica and the Leeward Islands were included in it, the truce would be "a spinning of endless difficulties and perplexities."

Lowther was furious when he found out that the reason for Philypeaux's change of heart was that Hamilton had sent him a letter by the lieutenant of the *Swallow* which said that Hamilton was very willing to send the ship to exchange the prisoners "because of the ill usage they met with from the Government" of Barbados. He further said that the captains of the men-of-war would not regard any understanding for a truce arrived at without their knowledge or consent.

The prisoners were "not as much as confined," Lowther told the council, indignantly, and if they were it did not become Captain Hamilton "to give any such information especially at such a time as that was."<sup>72</sup> Lowther also protested the captains' meddling to the Board of Trade. "I won't take it upon myself to say that Mr. Hamilton's conduct in this matter is criminal or if it be of what quality it is off," he concluded, but he begged for a clarification of his powers over the captains of the men-of-war.<sup>73</sup>

Due to the confusion about the truce, there was uneasiness in the eastern Caribbean until news of a lasting peace arrived in the spring. Even then the French prisoners were not exchanged. Months later, when private persons would no longer trust the credit of the island, the council concluded that there was "a necessity to let the French prisoners out of prison to support themselves by begging."<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Hamilton's letter of January 26, 1712/3 also contained Philypeaux's letter of December 26, 1712, Adm. 1:1878; Minutes of the Barbados council, January 13, 1712/3, C.O. 31:9.

<sup>73</sup> Lowther to the Board of Trade, January 26, 1712/3, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1712-14, No. 257.

<sup>74</sup> Minutes of the Barbados council, August 28, 1713, C.O. 31:9. In 1715, Governor du Quesne of Martinique sent to acquaint Lowther that the French "coasts and roads are filled every day with your ships coming to trade," and to beg Lowther to forbid it absolutely. At the same time

In March, 1712, the *Nightingale* brought word to Jamaica that negotiations for peace with the enemy were being started. There was, at the time, no peace in the island, for the admiral, Sir Hoveden Walker, was still carrying on his crusade against illegal trade and was bringing all vessels under the stern of his flagship; while the Jamaicans were writing home asking for the admiral's recall because he was permitting his captains to carry on an illegal trade in Negroes, to seize Spanish ships and gold, and to abuse and impress Spanish prisoners, to the ruin of trade on the Spanish Coast.

Because of these disputes, Walker refused to carry the prisoners of war to Petit Guavas, on Hispaniola, for the governor, Lord Archibald Hamilton, but instead sent them over on his own responsibility. He had "a regard for Lord Hamilton," Walker said, "but none for the governor of Jamaica." He went so far as to dispute the governor's right to wear a flag in his boat even in the harbor. The quarrel created a great stir at home among Lord Archibald's friends and relatives, and grave unrest in the island. The Board's only hope was that the recalling of Walker and the ending of the war would restore tranquillity to the island.<sup>75</sup>

The quarrels of the officials and the financial difficulties and irresponsibility of the islanders, as much as the hostilities of the war, worked hardship upon the prisoners, even after the war was ended. As for the larger aspects of the problem of the exchange of prisoners, it is clear that no plan was satisfactory in practice, especially in the eastern Caribbean. It was not feasible to return the prisoners to England, nor desirable since it depressed the essential trade in provisions from the north. To take prisoners and then return them locally to their homes, or privateering bases, proved troublesome, expensive and futile. As there were few land operations, the exchanging of a few planters and numerous privateers left the balance of war unchanged. It can be concluded that the taking of prisoners was no victory to either side, nor was it a determining factor in the outcome of the war or the peace.

Lowther complained of the "extraordinary and unwarranted civility" extended to the principal inhabitants of Martinique at "the Hooper banquet," in allowing them to view the forts and take soundings of the roads and bays, and of "the insolent and ungrateful return" made by the French, who assured Lowther that in twelve months they would be the master of the island and entertain him. Cf. Lowther to the Board of Trade, October 25, 1715, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1714-15, No. 654, 654iii.

<sup>75</sup> Hamilton to Dartmouth, March 5, March 31, 1713; to the Board of Trade, March 31, 1713; Dartmouth to the Board of Trade, February 14, 1712/3, *Calendar of State Papers, Col.*, 1712-14, Nos. 277, 291, 307.



COLLEGE TEXTBOOK TREATMENTS  
OF AMERICAN HISTORY

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## BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Studies which have been made of history and social science texts center around such aspects as their vocabularies, the personages whom they mention, and their treatments of the race question.<sup>1</sup> In 1931 the National Society for the Study of Education devoted Part II of its Yearbook to *The Role of the Textbook in American Education*. This paper is a further contribution to an extensive field of study.

The first American history textbook was written and published by John McCulloch, a Scotsman, who immigrated to America where he worked at Philadelphia from 1785 till 1795. His work was entitled *A Concise History of the United States from the Discovery of America till 1795*. The first edition of this history appeared in 1795, to be followed by second and third editions in 1797 and 1807. Spieske writes:

The first American History textbook grew out of no educational program, no need recognized by a thoughtful or enterprising teacher, no campaign by a patriotic organization that called the attention of the country to the necessity for some study of its past.<sup>2</sup>

## THE PROBLEM

The problem of this paper is to discuss the topics of American history, 1920-1940, to which writers of college textbooks of United States history have given most emphasis, and to discuss the way in which that emphasis was presented.

<sup>1</sup> Typical of such studies are: Charles Atschul, *The American Revolution in Our School Textbooks* (New York, 1917); Marie Elizabeth Carpenter, *The Treatment of the Negro in American History School Textbooks* (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1941); Arthur Walworth, *School Histories at War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938); Donald Michelson, *Personages on Three Levels in American History Textbooks* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1937); Arthur W. Steinhäuser, *An Evaluation of the Social Teachings found in a Selected Number of High School Textbooks* (Published Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1941).

<sup>2</sup> Alice Winfred Spieske, *The First Textbooks in American History* (New York, 1938), p. 104.

## METHOD

The present writer has been interested in the history textbook for some years, and this paper is a summary of a much larger and more detailed study on the college history textbook. The information of this paper was taken from the larger study.

Textbooks which were used were separated into three categories or classes. The first class consisted of one-volume histories of the United States; the second class was made up of two-volume editions; the third class was comprised of textbooks which treated the period since the Civil War. Nineteen college textbooks were used.

An outline of one of the textbooks in each of the three categories was made, and on each outline a page count was included for the various topics. Then another textbook was outlined and comparison with the initial outline was made. Finally, topics were selected to form a composite or comparative outline, and the viewpoints of the authors on such large topics as agriculture, politics, foreign policy, and labor were presented in quotations from the books.

## SELECTED VIEWPOINTS

1. *Politics and Political Personages*

President Harding received the most severe treatment from the writers included in this study: no attempt to whitewash him could be discerned. These judgments range in tone from the fairly sharp one expressed by Dwight Lowell Dumond to the caustic point of view adopted by Nichols and Nichols. Dumond declares: "The short period of Harding's administration turned out to be a sordid record of corruption and inefficiency."<sup>3</sup>

Nichols and Nichols asseverate:

Friendly and weak, self-indulgent and undisciplined, unintelligent and unassuming, Harding entered the presidency, handicapped by the Henchman's lifelong habit of letting things ride along for the taking.<sup>4</sup>

Nathaniel Stephenson tells us Coolidge "lacked the capacity of insight or originality of leadership."<sup>5</sup> Harlow writes, less stringently: "He believed that if the business man made money, his prosperity would reach down to the common people."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *A History of the United States* (New York, 1942), p. 773.

<sup>4</sup> *The Growth of American Democracy* (New York, 1939), p. 659.

<sup>5</sup> *A History of the United States* (New York, 1934), p. 983.

<sup>6</sup> *The Growth of the United States* (New York, 1932), p. 720.



One of the most diversely interpreted personalities is Herbert Hoover. Nathaniel Stephenson seems apologetic: "Herbert Hoover, who defeated Alfred E. Smith in 1928, had to deal with Coolidge's problems, but in aggravated form."<sup>7</sup> Forman comments as follows: "In his relations with Congress he was tactful and to a high degree successful."<sup>8</sup> Muzzey and Krout observe: "From the beginning of his administration, President Hoover's relations with Congress were unhappy."<sup>9</sup>

## 2. *The New Deal and Franklin D. Roosevelt*

Hacker and Kendrick when writing of this topic develop their expressions along these lines: "The New Deal, to put it baldly, assumed that it was possible to establish a permanent truce on class antagonisms."<sup>10</sup> Paxon contrasts Roosevelt and Hoover by stating: "Franklin D. Roosevelt was as skillful in meeting and holding men as Herbert Hoover was inept."<sup>11</sup> John D. Hicks gives President Roosevelt's attack of infantile paralysis in 1921 as the reason for "the transformation of a retired minor politician to a dynamic leader of men."<sup>12</sup>

Lingley and Foley write appraisingly of the New Deal: "Its purpose was to raise prices, to establish some measure of social security. . . ." <sup>13</sup> Mead declares: "In none of President Roosevelt's speeches or acts does it appear that he desired any significant modification of existing social classes or that he had any quarrel with the essential features of capitalism."<sup>14</sup> Hicks, however, writes of the fears of certain politicians that Roosevelt would "use his remarkable powers of leadership to promote untried and unorthodox policies."<sup>15</sup> And Hacker and Kendrick state of the AAA: "It meant nothing less than complete governmental regimentation."<sup>16</sup>

## 3. *Foreign Affairs*

History textbooks were often sententiously prophetic of another general world conflict. Nichols and Nichols affirm: "The

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 1118.

<sup>8</sup> *Our Republic* (New York, 1937), p. 849.

<sup>9</sup> *American History for Colleges* (Boston, 1938), p. 789.

<sup>10</sup> *The United States Since 1865* (New York, 1841), p. 687.

<sup>11</sup> *Recent History of the United States* (Boston, 1937), p. 697.

<sup>12</sup> *The American Nation* (Boston, 1941), II, p. 656.

<sup>13</sup> *Since the Civil War* (New York, 1936), p. 777.

<sup>14</sup> *The Development of the United States Since 1865* (New York, 1935), p. 612.

<sup>15</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 542.

people wished for peace, but heard continually from the lips of the President, cabinet and lesser persons, exciting denunciations of 'undemocratic powers.'"<sup>17</sup> Schlesinger writes pontifically: "The retreat from imperialism began even before Roosevelt entered office."<sup>18</sup> And Hicks wrote in the early months of 1941: "That the beleaguered British, now fighting gamely against incessant attacks from the air and the threat of invasion from the sea, could count on further aid from the United States when the need arose seemed evident."<sup>19</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

Politics was given the largest number of pages; agriculture came next; the New Deal and foreign affairs were next in importance. The New Deal received more space in one-volume histories than the Coolidge-Harding-Hoover administrations put together, and the projected or scheduled reforms of the New Deal in labor, business, and agriculture were emphasized. Discussion of foreign affairs centered around war debts and the payments thereof, the tariff, and particularly the Hawley-Smoot tariff, and the Good Neighbor Policy.

Two-volume histories were concerned largely with postwar conditions, foreign affairs, and the New Deal, including within postwar conditions social and economic readjustments, prohibition, reaction, inept leadership, the triumph of Republicanism corruption and scandal during the Harding administration, recovery and reform measures of the New Deal in business, labor and agriculture.

The histories of the period since 1865 outlined the conditions which confronted Roosevelt, adumbrating the decline of agriculture, the onset of depression, the crisis in the financial world, social security, currency changes, power, public works housing and relief, the Supreme Court fight, and the recovery and reform measures instituted by the New Deal in the American scene.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 747.

<sup>18</sup> *Political and Social Growth of the United States* (New York, 1941), p. 956.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 729.



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THE REPORT OF THE FRENCH MINISTER OF WAR  
TO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,  
JANUARY 11, 1792

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At a time when the fate of America is involved with that of the United Nations and all lovers of freedom over the world, in free man's last great chance, the present revolution affords additional historical evidence that national imperatives constitute the cardinal compulsives in those systems of strategy that mark out the main directions of the great powers in world politics.

Vital national interests have constituted the common denominator of the modern states system in which the torrential course of history has been affected by the nature and the strength of its creative vistas and dynamic energies. These significant determinants cannot be overlooked in any analysis of the forces and factors that have suggested directions in fashioning a national war policy in a revolutionary France.

Speaking the language of the philosophical speculations of the natural rights theory of man, the members of the French National Constituent Assembly had written out the Platonic capitals of "liberty, fraternity and equality" for all Frenchmen in the "Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen" on August 26, 1789.<sup>1</sup> Its seventeen specifications trace in dim outline the road to freedom that might be trod by those who were willing and capable to think and act in accordance with those dynamic compulsives that might create the finest hour in the struggle for freedom.

The passion of a great desire created an anxious awareness of the necessity of marking out new frontiers suggested in Cicero's "republic of law."<sup>2</sup> Lacking the total perspective of the Stoical "universal community,"<sup>3</sup> however, they beheld the national edifice of liberty as their utopia. Although the perspectives of their visions and the imperatives of their ideas envisaged a future in which the total national energies would be utilized in France for the common end that liberty might become the sym-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (New York, 1933), pp. 142-143.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, 1937), pp. 161-167.

<sup>3</sup> For complete analysis, cf. R. W. & A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West*, 6 vols. (London, 1927), I, 1-18.



bolic and undeciphered shorthand of a creative system of law and justice; and, in spite of the fact that the national legislature had renounced wars of conquest on May 22, 1790,<sup>4</sup> and had promised never to use the army to extend the egalitarian idealism beyond the French frontiers, the titanic events of a great revolution swept leaders and followers with such fierce tenacity that this new nationalism altered its original pattern, and France declared war on April 20, 1792.<sup>5</sup>

Between the opening of the States-General on May 5, 1789, and the declaration of war, France had utilized a nihilistic-creative pattern of action that had erased many of the norms of "absolutism" and had marked out many new frontiers. These salient departures from the Machiavellian intent of the "old régime," which had achieved its international splendor during the age of Louis XIV, 1643-1715, produced many vexing problems for a nascent France that had elaborated its challenge to the *status quo* in its declaration of principles that later attracted the attention of all lovers of liberty and justice under law.

In accordance with the magnificent urge of the new departure and in harmony with the desire of King Louis XVI to win his personal freedom; and, in so doing, assure the return to the reactionary and tyrannical ideas and political practices of the Bourbons, the national legislature and the king co-operated in preparing the situation for the declaration of war,<sup>6</sup> which vitally affected the subsequent history of Europe and the entire world.

The "Constitution of 1791"—the first in the history of France—had not altered to any great extent the power and the prerogative of the French monarch in foreign affairs. In the matter of the declaration of war and the affairs of state in general, the king's position had not been drastically changed legally, for the Minister of War was still named by the "King of France" and was constitutionally his agent in that role. Comte Louis de Narbonne held this critical post in the King's Ministry from December 7, 1791, to March 9, 1792,<sup>7</sup> during which period he prepared the situation for the declaration of war against Austria and Prussia.

<sup>4</sup> For affirmation of this policy, cf. *The Cambridge Modern History*, 13 vols. (1902-1912), VIII, 188-189.

<sup>5</sup> Louis R. Gottschalk, *The Era of the French Revolution* (New York, 1929), p. 202, gives details.

<sup>6</sup> The legislature was primarily interested in war as means of getting rid of the king.

<sup>7</sup> Louis R. Gottschalk, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-201.

With the rapid swing to the left,<sup>8</sup> however, there was an ever-increasing demand for a limitation of the powers of the ministry by means of specific laws in which the elementary principles of parliamentary government would be applied as a check to the Minister's power and authority. The authors of the *Constitution Militaire*<sup>9</sup> had stressed the importance of placing some restriction upon the powers of the Minister and his agents, and they had stated indefinitely their attitude in the tenth article of this instrument of military government. This article, however, merely suggested, "The Minister of War and all military agents are subject to responsibility in the case and in the manner which are and shall be determined by the Constitution."<sup>10</sup>

Over a year elapsed before the Constituent Assembly<sup>11</sup> took up the matter aggressively. Despite constitutional limitations upon the military activities of the Minister of War, he was still in position to advise the National Legislature with regard to the status of the *esprit de corps*; the fortifications, and the defense of the state. Although the relativistic powers of King, Minister, and Legislature were not clearly defined, the Minister of War had legalistic power to make a general survey of the military situation of the nation, and to make a report to the Legislature.

Soon after his appointment as Minister of War in December, 1791, M. de Narbonne made a personal reconnaissance of certain sectors of the frontiers in order "to assure himself and to report the actual state of the frontiers and the disposition of the army" to the Legislative Assembly. In order to fortify his imperial pretensions of reason with authority, he took a few officer specialists with him: M. d'Arcon, an outstanding officer of engineers, and M. d'Arblay, an artillery officer, both of whom were members of the Central Bureau of the General Staff; M. Desmottes, aide-de-camp and friend of Lafayette; M. de Delalelay d'Agier and M. Matthieu de Montmorency, "who bore no prejudice of the old order."<sup>12</sup> In short, he had been careful to select a group of "agreeing experts" who would also meet the approval of the national legislature.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

<sup>9</sup> Faustin Hélie, *Les Constitutions de la France* (Paris, 1870), pp. 103-104.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> The legislatures of the French Revolution were: (1) National Constituent Assembly, May 5, 1789-September 30, 1791; (2) Legislative Assembly, October 1, 1791-September 20, 1792; (3) The Convention, September 21, 1792-October 26, 1795.

<sup>12</sup> Baudoin, *Collection Générale des Décrets* (Paris, 1789-1791), XXIII, 22.



The capital purpose of the significant report was to convince the Assembly that France was not only ready but was prepared for a successful war. An intensive analysis reveals the "effervescing fumes" of a rising flame of a patriotic war spirit, which reminds one that "patriotism is often the last refuge of the scoundrel." In a study of this "war document," we shall content ourselves with a summary of its important features:<sup>13</sup>

#### I. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. *Object.* The Minister of War states his thesis concisely: "To assure himself of the dispositions of the troops."
2. *Morale.* He witnesses "... the courage and patriotism of all garrisons," and states that he had talked to men and officers with this end in view.
3. *Fortifications.* "As far as I can see, they are satisfactory." The early period of the wars of the French Revolution, however, demonstrate that he was suffering from "military blindness."
4. *Forts.*
  - a. *Lille* is "in excellent condition, but has one weakness—lack of sufficient communications for supply." He estimated that it would take 150,000 men to take it.
  - b. *Maubege* "has one weakness—lack of space, but nothing can be done to improve it."
  - c. *Charlemont* "is in excellent condition."
  - d. *Mezieres* is "excellent."
  - e. *Sedan* "suffers from obstruction of view."
  - f. *Metz* is "in most respectable shape."
  - g. *Bitche* is "in excellent condition."
  - h. *Laudan*, "the masterpiece of Vauban, will hold out for a long time."
  - i. *Strasbourg, Fort Louis, Schelestat, Brisach, Huningue, Belfort, Blamont, Bensancon.* "I find nothing to change in them" did not give the actual status of the forts on the frontier.

<sup>13</sup> *Journal Militaire* (Paris, 1790-An VIII), 15 Janvier, 1792, covers the report in detail. Baudoin, *op. cit.*, XXIII, 40-65, covers it also.

5. *Artillery.*
  - a. "All *places* are in excellent condition." He concluded, "I am assured of the execution of orders by the artillery and engineers."
  - b. "Foundries and arsenals are in full blast."
  - c. "It is not necessary to go into the details of munitions," which would have further revealed the irrationalities of his report.
6. *General Supplies.* "All precautions have been taken for the complete supply of the army."
7. *State of Preparedness.* "You see how well we are prepared against an attack—all forces are convinced in the name of the Constitution." This is a mere semantic verbalization.
8. *L'Armee du Nord.* "I ought to say in honor of M. Rochembeau, it is in excellent condition, and the General finds confidence that inspires love for liberty." In the words of Madame Roland, "Liberty, O, Liberty, how many things are done in thy name!"
9. *Metz.* The Minister tells of his conference at Metz with Rochembeau, Luckner, and Lafayette (Commanders of Armies), where the proposals for campaign were discussed; but he states that he can make no disclosures, for they must be kept as military secrets.
10. *Frontiers.*
  - a. *Dunkirk to Besoncon.* Along this frontier, there is a force of 240 battalions and 160 squadrons with necessary artillery."
  - b. "There is a camp for a second line of 100,000 men."
  - c. *Hospitals.* "There are hospitals sufficient for the campaign."
  - d. "There is a remount depot located at Lunessville for the supply of horses."
11. *Strasbourg.* "The most important fort in the kingdom is most redoubtable, an achievement which is due largely to the indefatigable activity of M. de Luckner and the patriotism of his troops."



12. "The National Guards demonstrated a great love for liberty, and a great desire to defend it."<sup>14</sup>
13. *Chefs*. He stresses their enthusiasm, for "There is not a single officer whom we need fear."<sup>15</sup>

## II. ACTUAL NUMBER OF TROOPS

1. *The actual number along the frontiers*. He reports a total force of eighty-eight battalions and forty-eight squadrons, "which assure the safety of the frontiers."
2. *Reserve*. He reports 150 battalions and 116 squadrons that had not been called to active duty.
3. *Total force*. He reports 75,000 infantry and 13,500 cavalry, which would be increased to an effective force of 110,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry.
4. *War and Peace*. Because of the fact that he was unable to give detailed and convincing statistics on the actual status of preparation [at one time for defense; at another for attack], he concludes his irrational report with a patriotic appeal. He calls on Frenchmen not to be frightened, "for the Assembly and the King march affirmatively with the Constitution. Peace or war will find us *en route*; it makes no difference; the end is decided; we merely wait. . . . There has never been a time since the opening of the Revolution when there has been so much good luck to defend it." Finally, he appeals: "We are threatened with a great number of enemies . . . and when danger ennobles a cause, it has only the support of which it is worthy." Here is William II's and Hitler's idea of encirclement on all sides.

## CONCLUSION

This misleading report of the French Minister of War derives from the partial and distorted observations concerning the actual status of the military preparation of France. The generalized points-of-view are set forth in a series of categories that

<sup>14</sup> The Minister fails to report how many were in ranks yearning to die for liberty. Both regulars and guards were not up to war strength, but the Minister fails to mention this in the Report.

<sup>15</sup> He fails to mention the fact that many officers had been unfaithful to the oath that they had taken on June 22, 1791, after the attempted flight of the King.

are stained with the labor of an end-result that did not conform to the actual energies of the state in transition. It lacked the moral qualities of a responsible minister of state whose cardinal task was to present the facts in such a manner that the leaders might have been inclined to mark out the new frontiers of liberty in accordance with the actual conditions and potentialities of that tragic hour in the history of the crisis state.

His report was the voice of destruction that did injustice to the society that had known the full meaning of the tyranny of a governmental system that had no regard for the rights and the energies of the common man. Although it was the expression of a kind of Hobbesian constitutionalism, it was Copernican distance from the heart-throb of an able and responsive government. In spite of its effort to beguile men from their fears, hatreds, and furies, it stands in the annals of France as a constant reminder that the irrationalities of the time of troubles do not constitute the rationalities of democratic means and ends.

By permitting the imagination to run riot, the Minister of War had reported falsely the military status of France for which the nation paid in blood, sweat and tears during the early months of the war. Standing in the shadow of a Nietzschean superman, he announced a Schopenhauerian will-to-power whose vitality achieved the nihilistic proportions of a Spenglerian gloom in an era of revolution and war which spelled out the beginning of the end of the grandiose ideals of 1789; and, thereby, postponed the full and final achievement of an affirmative and militant democracy.



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THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I  
THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA  
The first discovery of America was made by Christopher Columbus in 1492. He was an Italian explorer who sailed across the Atlantic Ocean in search of a new route to the East Indies. On October 12, 1492, he landed on the island of San Salvador in the Bahamas. This event marked the beginning of European exploration of the Americas.

CHAPTER II  
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE COLONIES  
The early years of the colonies were marked by hardship and struggle. The settlers faced many difficulties, including lack of food, shelter, and protection from Native Americans. Despite these challenges, the colonies grew and developed, laying the foundation for the United States.

CHAPTER III  
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR  
The Revolutionary War was fought between the thirteen American colonies and Great Britain from 1775 to 1783. The war was fought over the issue of self-governance and the right to be taxed without representation. The colonies ultimately won the war, leading to the creation of the United States of America.

CHAPTER IV  
THE CONSTITUTION  
The Constitution is the supreme law of the United States. It was drafted in 1787 and ratified in 1788. The Constitution established the framework for the federal government and the rights of the states and citizens.

CHAPTER V  
THE CIVIL WAR  
The Civil War was fought between the Union and the Confederacy from 1861 to 1865. The war was fought over the issue of slavery. The Union ultimately won the war, leading to the abolition of slavery and the preservation of the Union.

CHAPTER VI  
THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA  
The Reconstruction Era was the period following the Civil War, from 1865 to 1877. It was a time of rebuilding and reform, as the South was brought back into the Union and the rights of African Americans were addressed.

CHAPTER VII  
THE GREAT DEPRESSION  
The Great Depression was a severe economic downturn that lasted from 1929 to 1933. It was caused by a combination of factors, including overproduction, speculation, and a lack of government intervention. The New Deal was implemented to address the crisis.

CHAPTER VIII  
THE SECOND WORLD WAR  
The Second World War was fought between the Allies and the Axis powers from 1939 to 1945. The United States entered the war in 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The war resulted in the defeat of the Axis powers and the establishment of the United Nations.

CHAPTER IX  
THE COLD WAR  
The Cold War was a period of tension and rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991. It was characterized by the arms race, proxy wars, and the space race. The war ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER X  
THE PRESENT  
The present is a time of rapid change and progress. The United States continues to be a leading nation in the world, facing new challenges and opportunities. The future is bright and full of potential.









